Running Assessments Summary

Political Stability and Civil Unrest

Introduction

The Political Stability and Civil Unrest Running Assessment aims to present the likelihood of major civil unrest,  coup d'état, and other risks related to political tensions at a given time. PSA then assesses the potential impact of these events to businesses and organizations in the Philippines.  PSA assesses that the Political Stability and Civil Unrest situation of the Philippines to be “deteriorating slowly” at this current time, as PSA does not see an increased likelihood of major civil unrest or political destabilization, but analysts also do not see either an improvement or resolution to the political infighting.   

Summary

The Supreme Court’s decision on July 25 has effectively shut down the impeachment process against Vice President Sara Duterte until next year. According to the ruling, the House of Representatives had violated the rule limiting impeachment complaints against an official to one per year in passing the fourth impeachment complaint against her, all while the first three that were filed were not referred to any committees. With this decision, the Vice President will continue to remain in her national function undisturbed until February 2026, when the bar on initiating a new impeachment proceeding is lifted.   PSA anticipates that pro-impeachment groups and legislators will either lobby for the continuation of the impeachment this year or prepare for initiating the process again next year. Many observers do note however that there may not be enough time for the impeachment next year as it is close to the elections. The stricter procedural rules that the Supreme Court has set in its latest decision will likely also require more time and preparations for deliberations.   In the short-term, PSA continues to believe that a successful destabilization plot against the current administration to be unlikely. Rallies and demonstrations for different campaigns (the continuation of the impeachment on one hand, the release of the former President from incarceration is another) are expected to continue. But based on the previous protests, particularly on the arrest of former President Rodrigo Duterte, these gatherings are generally peaceful. PSA further expects that the president’s coalition will continue to fragment as politicians try to position themselves for the upcoming 2028 elections. This means that alliances will continue to change and shift until the next presidential administration comes in.   In general, these political events are likely to present the following risks:  

• Reputational risk: The reputation for being a weaker administration, potentially creating the impression of an uncertain business climate that is not conducive to investments. Though PSA notes that typically the last three years of a Philippine presidential administration are marred with political infighting and fragmentation of the presidential coalition. 

• Security risk: A possibility of limited violence between members/groups of opposing political supporters in rallies/demonstrations. PSA notes that recent protests, though increased in frequency, have been generally peaceful and are framed as general events than traditional rallies. 

Background of events

 The impeachment proceedings of Vice President Sara Duterte had generally been slow and onset with delays. On July 25, the Supreme Court (SC) of the Philippines ruled that the impeachment proceedings of Vice President Sara Duterte are “null and void," thereby cancelling the upcoming trial and all other related hearings on this matter until next year.   Below is the recap of the impeachment proceedings to date:   

• In February, the House of Representatives impeached Vice President Sara Duterte on charges including “betrayal of public trust” and constitutional violations. Various observers stressed the constitutional mandate for the Senate trial to proceed “forthwith.” However, Senate President Chiz Escudero clarified that the trial could only begin once Congress reconvened on June 2, noting that the Senate lacks the legal authority to convene an impeachment court during the legislative recess. 

• In May, Senate President Escudero officially moved the presentation of the articles of impeachment to June 11 despite early calls from minority senators to convene as early as June 2. He defended this by pointing out that impeachment proceedings cannot legally start during a recess but will resume “forthwith” once sessions resume. 

• While the Senators took oath as presiding officers for the impeachment trial court on June 11, the majority voted to “remand” the impeachment complaint to the House instead. They asked the lower chamber to address two key issues: that it did not violate the one-year rule preventing multiple impeachment filings within a year, and that the incoming 20th Congress supports moving forward with the trial. The Senate President stressed the case was not dismissed and ordered that a summons be issued to the Vice President regardless. 

• After June 11, the House certified that the impeachment complaint complies with constitutional requirements but noted they cannot yet confirm the 20th Congress’s support since it hasn’t convened yet. Meanwhile, Vice President Duterte formally answered the summons on June 23, arguing that the impeachment complaint violated the one‑year bar rule.  

• On July 8, the Supreme Court ordered both the Senate and House to produce detailed records concerning the impeachment complaints, including prior referrals and procedural timelines. In compliance, on July 19 the House of Representatives submitted additional documentation affirming that all four impeachment complaints were handled in full alignment with constitutional mandates. 

• On July 25, the Supreme Court ruled that the impeachment of Vice President Duterte is “null and void,” since the House of Representatives violated the rule limiting impeachment complaints against an official to one per year. Some pro-impeachment legislators are considering filing a motion for reconsideration to appeal the Court's decision. But until then, all hearings and proceedings related to the Vice President's impeachment is put into a halt. 

Security Risks 

 PSA continues to assess that a successful political destabilization event against the current administration is unlikely in the short-term. Since the beginning of this administration, the military and police have consistently affirmed their non-partisan stance and loyalty to the duly elected government, as mandated by the Constitution. This is particularly significant as an indicator of political stability, given that historically, destabilization attempts were often supported or instigated by members of the military and police.   While former President Duterte remains a popular figure, support for the current administration is high in the upper ranks of military and police leadership and active-duty personnel. PSA also notes that the former President’s popularity has also waned since his departure from office. Even amongst those who express grievances with the current administration, the number of personnel who would actually be willing to risk their lives or careers on behalf of the former President is very low.   PSA notes that the reaction from the police and military following the former President’s arrest has been a positive indicator for political stability. The arrest operation against former President Duterte was generally smooth and done “by the book,” despite previous fears of a potential stand-off between arresting forces, the president’s supporters, and perhaps even the Duterte patriarch himself. The operation was also led by then-General Nicolas Torre III, a high-ranking police officer raised in Mindanao (specifically Jolo, Sulu), who, prior to this also led an operation against Pastor Apollo Quiboloy. General Torre later on was promoted as the new Philippine National Police (PNP) of President Marcos.    While the security situation was uncertain for a brief moment in Davao City and some areas in Mindanao following the former President’s arrest, PSA notes that no untoward security incidents have happened since.    Since former President’s incarceration in the Hauge, Netherlands, PSA has observed an increase in the frequency of protests both by pro-accountability groups and pro-Duterte supporters. The rallies of these pro-accountability groups have always been expected as they have been the loudest and most persistent voices calling for an international investigation into the Duterte senior’s drug war. Meanwhile, pro-Duterte groups ramped up their mobilization efforts for prayer rallies and mass gathering events (that are more of celebratory in nature, than a protest) in expression of support for the former President and his family, though larger turnouts of more than 10,000 were recorded in Mindanao, particularly Davao. While the pro-Duterte camp struggled to garner more than 1,000 people in gatherings in Metro Manila and parts of Luzon. PSA notes that these gatherings have largely been peaceful and have caused minimal disruptions in Metro Manila.    PSA further expects the protests and demonstrations to continue in the short term. Pro-impeachment groups will likely hold rallies in front of the Senate building or the Supreme Court calling for the continuation of the Vice President’s impeachment. On the other hand, pro-Duterte supporters may continue attending events that call for the release of the former President from the Hauge, Netherlands.  

Reputational Risk 

 As the political infighting between the presidential family and the Duterte camp continue, there is a reputational risk for the Philippine government to be perceived as even more disunified and unpredictable. This is also further exacerbated by the delays in the impeachment proceedings, which some political observers interpret as a sign of weak governance and ignorance of rule of law.  These perceptions, some economic experts argue, could further undermine investor confidence in the Philippines.  Due to the personality-driven nature of Philippine politics, government leaders are largely elected for their personalities rather than political platform or party affiliations, and so policy direction is mostly driven by these leaders’ own legislative preferences and self-interest. A lack of policy continuity between administrations is an often-cited criticism for the Philippine government and a source of uncertainty for investors.  As the current administration enters its third year, PSA notes that political infighting within the presidential coalition will continue and even worsen. A Philippine president's last three years is usually a time when allegiance to the president weakens and political alliances are remade in preparation for the next coming elections.   In the short-term, political alliances will largely be divided into two camps: the President’s team and the Vice President’s camp. While some observers note the rising popularity of the liberal opposition (PSA’s terminology for the remnants of the Liberal Party), this group to date is too small and does not hold the same level of influence as it did prior to 2016.   Independent politicians, also known as political butterflies, will choose their allegiances based on shared goals and who they think is likely to win political struggles. Their support, albeit temporary, will be instrumental to the Vice President’s impeachment trial, where some of these independents remain unsure of where to stand.  

Crime

Persistence of Kidnapping in 2025

There have been concerns that the volume and incidence of kidnapping in the Philippines have been worsening in 2025. As of writing, PSA has recorded 59 kidnapping incidents from January to November 2025, lower than the 72 recorded in the same period in 2024. Annual incident volumes have generally been stable and in decline since their high points in 2017 to 2019. While analysts believe that crime statistics in general are not the most reliable in the Philippines due to external, systemic factors, they remain one of the only available references for analysis. Nonetheless, PSA remains cautious of making any assumptions related to the trajectory of kidnapping and related crimes based on available statistics alone This is especially the case in the short term (i.e., month to month), as incident volumes tend to fluctuate significantly. What can be observed are patterns and similarities in recent high-profile abductions. Many of these incidents were targeted and planned by the suspects, who are often already connected to the victims by employment, hence the relative level of sophistication in their execution. Analysts have yet to see any indicators that foreigners, especially businesspersons and expats, are being randomly targeted for ransom. PSA emphasizes the following advice to mitigate the risk of kidnapping:

• Vary your travel routes to and from your home, workplace/school, and other frequently visited locations.
• Use different vehicles on oft-taken routes if and when possible.
• Be aware of and understand the level of kidnapping risk you and your family/dependents may have, whether as a function of your location, occupation, or personal profile. 
• Conduct formal risk and threat assessments of workplaces, schools, and places of residence when possible.
• Domestic staff should have backgrounds screened prior to employment and briefed on the need to maintain confidentiality of family movements, routines, and finances.
• Drivers should attend security and awareness driving courses.
• Vehicles should be tinted to limit visibility of the occupants. The front windshield should remain un-tinted for road safety.
• Attach or use tracking devices and applications on all personal devices and vehicles if and when possible.
• Refrain from posting information such as whereabouts and activities on social media in real time.
• Install SOS applications such as Everbridge or Parachute (iOS exclusive) to discreetly transmit important information regarding their location and movements to a trusted person.
• Brief staff and family members not to disclose travel itineraries, hotel plans, security arrangements, or schedules to outsiders.
• Provide training to family and staff on surveillance, detection, and reporting.

Petty Crimes in Central Business Districts

Authorities regard the holiday season as a period when petty crime is higher than in previous quarters due to increased public activity and the perception of criminal actors that people have more cash on hand. Petty crimes like theft, pickpocketing, and robbery are crimes of opportunity, making them difficult to anticipate and prevent. Increased social media visibility may also create the perception of a worsening crime situation in the region. It is often up to an individual to practice personal security measures to mitigate the risk of these incidents. PSA’s general advice is to:

• Keep an eye on one’s belongings, especially when in crowded places. As much as possible, always keep any bag on your person.
• Avoid handling valuables like your mobile phone or wallet on the street. If needed, use your mobile phone near a well-lit establishment where there is visible security.
• Always maintain situational awareness in public.
• Try to “blend in” with your surroundings when considering how to present yourself in public. Be mindful of clothing and accessory choices, especially when going to “risky” areas such as entertainment districts or densely populated tourist sites.
• Do not carry large amounts of cash, passport, and other valuables unless necessary.

Cybercrime Attacks Against Companies and Individuals

Cybercrime incidents against individuals remain a concern, with a noticeable surge typically observed during the holidays.  Authorities have warned about the rise in scams during the holidays, particularly fraudulent online shopping schemes and deceptive solicitations. These attacks frequently employ social engineering tactics through text hijacking or spoofing, phishing (SMS-phishing, voice-phishing, QR-code phishing, etc.), and the malicious use of artificial intelligence (AI) and deep-fakes. Threat actors utilizing these methods  rely on psychological manipulation to trick victims into voluntarily divulging or providing confidential information and access to unauthorized individuals.  Nonetheless, PSA emphasizes that cybercriminals do not wait for a specific time of the year to strike  and operate year-round. They tend to take advantage of various factors, including but not limited to: 

• Surge in digital and in-person transactions
• Increased online activity
• Heightened emotional state
• Haste and distraction

PSA notes that phishing scams, particularly through text (smishing) messages and email, remains a significant concern for individuals and organizations in the country. Cybercriminals utilize devices such as International Mobile Subscriber Identify (IMSI) catchers and SMS blasters to conduct SMS spoofing. This threat is amplified as threat actors increasingly leverage Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance their cyber operations, particularly in generating highly persuasive and personalized phishing content. Furthermore, some email scams are getting harder to spot as Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) provides less skilled criminals with ready-made tools and templates to create highly convincing emails to perfectly mimic legitimate organizations. PSA notes that threat actors are increasingly exploiting AI tools including deepfake technology, to significantly enhance and automate their illicit operations. While AI developers have implemented safeguards within these tools, threat actors are actively employing work arounds, such as ‘jailbreaking’ or crafting intricate prompts, in attempts to bypass these restrictions. Malicious use-case of AI tools include:

• Enhancing social engineering tactics: Using AI, threat actors can significantly enhance their social engineering tactics by automating and easily creating deeply personalized phishing attacks across various channels. This allows them to generate highly convincing messages and content. 
• Using deep fake technology to drive misinformation campaigns: Threat actors have been leveraging deepfake technology to create and spread misleading content. There is an increasing instance of fake Meta (formerly Facebook) pages sharing deepfake videos of Filipino tycoons promoting investment scams or fake health products.  
• Malicious software (malware) refinement and cyberattack assistance: Open AI and Google Gemini highlighted in separate reports how their platforms are being leveraged by threat actors to enhance the effectiveness of their operations such as developing and refining their malware and writing scripts to automate their tasks.

In previous advisories, PSA highlighted several factors that contribute to the rise in cybercrime cases, including those observed during the holidays. Staff should be regularly reminded not to overshare information on social media which can eventually be exploited by threat actors in various social engineering attacks. Staff should also be reminded to always check the validity of the source and pay close attention to any signs of a possible scam before interacting with any requests. Additionally, staff should also be regularly reminded to secure their personal accounts (social media, banking apps, others) amid the risk of cyber scams. Authorities encourage cybercrime victims to report the incident to either the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), PNP Anti-Cybercrime Group, or the NBI Cybercrime Division. The CICC notes that while there are multiple agencies for reporting cybercrime incidents, there is no single designated agency, as cybercrime cases often involve inter-agency collaboration. Organizations are advised to report cybercrime incidents to the agency they deem most appropriate based on the nature and urgency of the case.  Victims are advised to collect evidence regarding the incident and other relevant information, including the scammer’s contact details, messages, and any financial transactions. If the scam is related to investments or consumer protection, victims may also file a complaint with consumer protection agencies such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Scams involving banks and financial institutions, particularly e-wallets, remain a concern for individuals.  The public is advised to be more vigilant of these scams. Here are some recommendations to help prevent being targeted for cyber-related incidents: 

• Individuals are advised not to overshare information online - particularly on social media platforms, as this can make it easier for threat actors to gather important information which can be used against you or other people to conduct malicious activities such as phishing.
• Do not immediately click on any links or download any attachments allegedly from any organization or colleague without fully verifying the validity of the source.  Upon receiving a suspicious message or call, refrain from responding or clicking any links and remain vigilant for common red flags such as urgency or requesting for sensitive information.
• Be aware of fake websites or social media pages that may appear legitimate. These often use the same logo, colors, and layout to appear genuine. Victims often fall for phishing links and fake sites that were designed to look like an official website or social media profile. 
• Do not store large amounts of money in e-wallets (i.e. Gcash, Maya, Gotyme). There is an observed risk in using e-wallet for storing large amounts of money because they are not regulated by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). They are also perceived to be less secure than bank accounts and are often used only for quick and simple transactions. 
• Make purchases online from reputable sellers and secure your payment methods. Some online scam incidents involve customers being overcharged through multiple payment methods. Proceed with caution when using Meta Marketplace or other social media platforms to make any sort of transaction.
• Never share your One-Time Pin (OPT) or Mobile Number Personal Identification Number (MPINS) with anyone. No legitimate organization will contact you and ask for your OTP. Only enter your OTP on official websites or apps that you initiated. If you start receiving OTP SMS messages from your bank that you did not request, contact your bank and notify them that your account may have been compromised.
• Understand how potentially serious it is to have your phone, laptop, or any device hacked or stolen if you use them to access financial accounts or sensitive information. Make sure you can remotely access your device or accounts if your device is compromised. Immediately report the incident to your IT Department, Cybersecurity Team, or Supervisor if a corporate account or device has been compromised.

Foreign Conflict

PSA assesses that foreign conflict risk in the Philippines is low in the short term (roughly the next six months), but geopolitical tensions over the next decade in the region are likely to continue to increase. Globally, there are a number of indicators that we live in an era of relatively elevated risk of foreign conflict. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the continued relative increase in Chinese military power compared to potential adversaries, and the potential for an armed conflict between China and Taiwan all contribute to an elevated risk of conflict compared to previous decades.   Analysts continue to believe that the situation between China and Taiwan is the most concerning with regard to the potential for armed conflict over the course of the decade. Any outbreak of a major regional war, including a China-Taiwan conflict, would have a massive impact on the Philippine economy, even if the Philippines was a neutral party.    While tensions continue to be elevated in the West Philippine Sea, and there is increased potential for some kind of crisis or armed skirmish, PSA does not see any desire on the part of China, the Philippines, or the United States to actually fight a war over the West Philippine Sea. The parties involved are likely to seek to de-escalate, even after a violent miscalculation or a clash.    

On the Risk of Conflict in The West Philippine Sea

In the short and long-term, the Philippines and China continue to face elevated tensions in the West Philippine Sea, but not to the point where both parties will be at risk of war. Minor ramming incidents of Philippine vessels and injuries associated with water cannons have become relatively routine during encounters between the Philippine Coast Guard and Chinese vessels. The Chinese government has continually shown that it is willing to take actions that could potentially cause the death of Filipino coast guard personnel or civilians in the West Philippine Sea.   There will continue to be a contest taking place through “grey zone tactics,” lawfare, military modernization, and diplomacy. The Philippines and China will try to find ways to react to each other and pressure each other, for example China recently returning floating barriers to Scarborough Shoal. However, PSA does not see a desire on the side of any party to escalate this contest to armed conflict.  

Potential Escalations in the South China Sea	Armed conflict Multiple skirmishes Death or injury of Chinese personnel Armed seizure of PH outpost	Very unlikely
	Seizure of unoccupied feature by the Chinese government Deaths of Filipino service/crew members	Reasonably Probable
	Major ramming of Philippine boats Injuries to Philippine personnel Minor ramming	Already happening

However, even if Filipino personnel were killed in the in West Philippine Sea, that does not mean that the Philippines and China would be at war. If a Filipino is killed by a Chinese government action in the West Philippine Sea, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has indicated that he would activate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. While the activation of the Mutual Defense Treaty would bring the United States military more directly into the equation, it does not necessarily mean war. Even after injuries inflicted on Filipino personnel, the Philippine military and government have exercised great restraint and sought to de-escalate any potential conflict. This is most notable after the June 2024 incident at Ayungin shoal, where even after serious injury to Philippine Navy personnel, the Philippines exercised extreme restraint.  Even upon the activation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Philippine and US governments are likely to work to craft a policy response that is perceived as proportionate but would limit the risk of war.    Nonetheless, if the situation in the West Philippine Sea were to escalate further, there is a strong potential that the Philippine and Chinese governments may retaliate against each other economically.  The Chinese government may impose import restrictions on goods from the Philippines, or declare that the Philippines is unsafe for tourism, as it did in the past during points of tension with the Aquino administration and has since done with other countries during points of tension.  Some Philippine politicians have at times called for an embargo of Chinese goods when tensions are specifically high, even if none has pulled the trigger on such a measure.   There is less certainty how China would reach if it suffered casualties in the West Philippine Sea. Chinese actions are risky not just for Philippine personnel, but ramming incidents or dangerous maneuvers by aircraft could also result in injuries for Chinese personnel. It is an open question if the Chinese military and national government have the same capacity to de-escalate if one of its personnel is injured or killed.   Strategically, the situation in the West Philippine Sea is perhaps similar to the situation on the Indian and Chinese border in the Himalayas in the early 2000s. In 2020, clashes on the Himalayan border resulted in the deaths of tens of Indian and Chinese soldiers. The dispute has continued to be a contest of will and logistics, positioning of forces, and construction of strategic infrastructure, but has not led to a war between the two countries.    The kinds of scenarios that should be considered for tensions and potential violence in the West Philippine Sea include the below. PSA continues to assess that the most dangerous scenarios are unlikely to occur.  

On China-Taiwan Tensions

PSA maintains that the likelihood of a conflict between China and Taiwan in the short-term is low but that the likelihood of conflict is trending upwards. Over the next decade, there is a strong likelihood that geopolitical tensions between China and Taiwan will continue to escalate.  A conflict between China and Taiwan is not likely until China believes it is capable of succeeding in an invasion of the island of Taiwan. Some estimates from the US and Taiwanese defense departments assess that China may have the capability to conduct an invasion in 2027. There is an increasing depth of literature from US based analysts arguing the Chinese government is entering a “strategic window,” sometime between 2027 and the early 2030s, whereby military capabilities may make an invasion of Taiwan feasible, before that window closes amid stagnating economic growth in China. The American intelligence community has made its belief public that Chinese leadership has directed the Chinese military to have the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, but that a decision to invade has not yet been made.     Alternatively, analysts widely believe that the People’s Republic of China might risk a war if certain red lines are crossed, even if it does not yet clearly have the capability to invade Taiwan. China is likely to go to war if Taiwan explicitly declares independence for example, even if China does not yet have a clear capability to invade. In such a scenario, China may resort to a blockade of Taiwan, or move to seize outlying Taiwanese islands such as Kinmen or Matsu. A blockade of Taiwan, particularly if it was enforced violently with Chinese ground-based missiles and the Chinese air force, is more within Chinese military capabilities even today. Even now, China likely maintains a capability to close Taiwanese ports to ship traffic if it is willing to use anti-ship missiles to target traffic into those ports, or to target the ports themselves with ballistic missiles and other weapons. However, such actions would likely provoke a regional war with the United States. The Taiwanese government, moreover, is very likely to continue to avoid crossing said red lines.    Additionally, PSA assesses that there will likely be a variety of short-term indicators of a potential conflict as tensions between China and Taiwan rise, and for the most part, these indicators are still not present. Chinese military capability to conduct an invasion or blockade is steadily increasing, as evident through larger training exercises and deployment of new military technology. However, there are very likely to be other operational indicators of an invasion, such as a major military build-up on the Chinese coast that would be visible to civilian observers and a significant increase in Chinese stockpiling of fuel in its strategic oil reserve.  Unfortunately, the visible indicators for a potential invasion are more numerous compared to a blockade of Taiwan, which would be easier for China to implement on short notice.     PSA still does not believe that a conflict is imminent or unavoidable, and we still don’t see significant short-term signs of conflict. However, we continue to assess that tensions are likely to be elevated over the next decade, and that tensions are likely to grow as China’s military power and capabilities increase relative to Taiwan and the USA.  Any conflict between China and Taiwan would be deeply damaging to the Philippine economy, even if the Philippines was a neutral party. Any conflict would disrupt global trade and supply chains, but even more so for organizations based in the Philippines, due to the geographic position of the Philippines neighboring Taiwan. A conflict between China and Taiwan would partially be fought in Philippine territorial waters and likely in Philippine airspace, the northernmost point of the Philippines is only some 100 kilometers from Taiwan, and Metro Manila is only 800 kilometers from Taiwan. The Philippine economy is highly dependent on food and fuel imports, particularly petroleum products (the Philippines imports almost 100 percent of its petroleum products). It is difficult to imagine that the normal importation of fuel, food, and raw materials would happen in the Philippines while a major armed conflict was taking place in the region. The Philippine internet may also be vulnerable to disruptions due to its reliance on undersea cables.  There is also a concern that the Philippines will host an influx of refugees from Taiwan amidst a conflict.   Furthermore, if tensions result in a war between China and the United States, there are strong possibilities that the Philippines will be pulled into a conflict directly. China for example could preemptively strike Philippine bases where the United States maintains military forces on a rotational basis. In general, PSA believes that   If the Philippines becomes a direct party to a conflict, the government will call up the reserves of the armed forces and potentially redirect the economy to a war footing, redirecting economic capacity to military purposes. Critical infrastructure, some of which serves dual military and civilian purposes, such as ports and airports, could be targeted. If the Chinese government decided to strike with long-range one-way attack drones, much of the Philippine power infrastructure and internet infrastructure is within range of these relatively inexpensive weapon systems. A war would partially be fought in Philippine waters and airspace, but we don’t see the Philippines being subject to widespread violence or indiscriminate targeting by a foreign military. Outside of some scenarios involving Batanes, we don’t see an invasion of any kind as plausible.    Planning for how the Philippine economy would function under wartime conditions is not robust, as Civil Defense in the Philippines has overwhelmingly been about natural disaster preparedness and response.   Civil defense planning for a foreign armed conflict is very underdeveloped. There are no particular mandates to the private sector about how to protect critical infrastructure such as power generation and transmission or telecommunications. The security of some critical infrastructure is coordinated through the Office of Transportation Security, but this has largely been focused on counterterrorism, and non-transportation critical infrastructure, like energy, is not covered by any equivalent agency.    There are also likely to be opportunities for the private sector in light of increasing geopolitical tensions.  There will be opportunities to expand the Philippines defense industrial base, or otherwise leverage the growing relationship between the Philippines and its allies for business opportunities.   

Potential Impact of a Major Middle East Conflict

Tensions between Iran and Israel have been elevated since October 7, 2023. Since then, Israel and Iran have directedly attacked each other. The world is waiting to see what kind of policy the Trump administration takes toward Iran, if a more confrontational approach is adopted or if negotiations are emphasized.   The major impact for the Philippines of a potential armed conflict between Iran and USA/Israel would be the impact on global energy trade. The Philippines imports almost all of its petroleum products from foreign sources, both in the form of crude oil from the Middle East and Malaysia, and in the form of refined oil from Asian countries. The Philippines has no strategic oil reserve, and only has on hand what various oil companies are currently importing or what is being refined at the one refinery in Bataan. Iran has extensive capabilities to disrupt the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf in the case of an armed conflict, despite the relative disparity of military power between it and its potential opponents. In the case of an armed conflict, the USA would work re-open the Persian Gulf to oil traffic, but civilian vessels would be under threat for some period of time. Being reliant on foreign oil imports, and with no strategic oil reserve of its own, the Philippines would face a situation analogous to the Arab Oil embargo of 1973.  

Potential for Conflict on the Korean Peninsula

Relations on the Korean Peninsula between North and South Korea have been tense for several years. In 2023, South Korea announced the partial suspension of the inter-Korean comprehensive military agreement, leading to more military exercises closer to the border by both parties and intelligence collection across the border as well. In early 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stated that reunification between the North and the South was no longer viable, then proceeded to dismantle North Korean organizations meant to support reunification.   However, while there is an increased risk of armed clashes or some form of limited armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, these types of incidents will have limited relevance for the Philippines, unless they escalate to a major regional armed conflict involving the superpowers. Escalation to that level appears unlikely at this point in time.   

Potential Escalations in the Korean Peninsula	Armed conflict involving both the US and China over the Korean Peninsula	Very unlikely	Very relevant to the Philippines economically and in terms of security
	Sustained armed conflict between North and South Korea Multiple skirmishes between North and South Korea	Very unlikely	Some relevance to the Philippines economically and in terms of security
	Artillery exchange between North and South Korea Limited skirmish on the border	Reasonably Probable	Very limited relevance to the Philippines economically and in terms of security
	Elevated intelligence operations across the DMZ Elevated weapons tests by North Korea (rocket forces or nuclear weapons)	Already happening	Very limited relevance to the Philippines economically and in terms of security

 

Elevated Tensions Between Pakistan and India

Following the April 22 attack at Pahalgam, Kashmir, tensions have been elevated between India and Pakistan. If the situation continues to escalate, a limited strike by India, followed by a subsequent armed skirmish, is the most likely scenario. This kind of limited armed conflict between the two sides is likely to have limited impact on the Philippines, although it may temporarily spook investment markets. Neither India nor Pakistan are the most important trading partners with the Philippines, and a skirmish between India and Pakistan is unlikely to significantly disrupt trade from India (although depending on the nature of the conflict, trade with Pakistan could be disrupted).  If there is an armed clash between India and Pakistan, the world will be nervously watching for the possibility of a nuclear exchange, which would have tremendous impacts on the whole planet. However, it is more likely any armed conflict between India and Pakistan will remain non-nuclear and will end when the Indian government feels that it has achieved its political objectives through a substantial show of force. 

Communist Insurgency

PSA's Monthly Overview (as of November 26, 2025): PSA recorded nine New People’s Army (NPA)-related violent incidents in October 2025, a decline from the 15 incidents reported in the previous month. Rebel attacks were recorded in Central and Southern Luzon (Bicol Region) and Visayas, while no incidents were recorded in Mindanao. In October, military encounters with the NPA occurred in different areas in Luzon and Visayas. Authorities disclosed that military troops responded to reports of armed rebels allegedly extorting from locals. Analysts note that rebels are known to extort “revolutionary tax” from local communities where they continue to operate, which are typically in the form of cash, food, and medical supplies, among others. Additionally, the Philippines was hit by at least three strong typhoons in October. Rebel activities were affected by unfavorable weather conditions, while military troops were mobilized for disaster response. Nonetheless, four NPA assassination attacks were recorded during this period. These attacks were carried out against individuals tagged as military informants by the NPA in Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental. PSA’s sources in the military generally concur that the Negros Island Region remains a hotspot for rebel activities. The insurgency situation has improved compared to its peak around the 1980s, but the rebel commands in the area remain active, owing largely to its long history in the region. PSA's Forward-Looking Assessment (as of November 26, 2025): Over the short term, PSA anticipates that Communist insurgency activity will continue to fluctuate on a month-to-month basis, but it will continue to trend downwards. NPA operational capacity is clearly diminished in comparison to 2017 and 2018, and the vast majority of NPA activity is conducted by small groups of rebels attacking soft targets, such as isolated government soldiers, CAFGU checkpoints, and isolated pieces of heavy equipment in the case of businesses. Over the long term, the situation is characterized by uncertainty depending on several factors, including the success of the government’s humanitarian relief and economic development policies. Progress on the proposed peace talks between the Philippine government and the Communist insurgency groups has been slow, and the government continues to bank on the gains of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC). According to Presidential Peace Adviser Secretary Carlito Galvez Jr., the government intends to have the final peace agreement with the Communist insurgency groups by 2026. The CPP-NPA retains a level of popular support particularly in rural areas, although the military claims that the group’s recruitment and fund-generation capabilities for its “legal fronts” have now been significantly diminished, hence the decision to tag all guerilla fronts in the country as “weakened guerilla fronts.” As of this time, the Communist insurgency is characterized by the following tactics, techniques, and characteristics: Targeting Security Forces

• Assassinations
• Harassment (limited engagements with small arms)
• Ambushes with small arms and improvised explosive devices or IEDs (the NPA has displayed a continued capability in a limited number of instances to conduct complex small arms and IED ambushes. Our sense is that the security forces disrupt far more of these attempted attacks than the NPA successfully executes).

Targeting Corporations with Distributed Operations in Rural Areas:

• Extortion
• Arson attacks targeting isolated and poorly protected pieces of heavy equipment
• Raids that involve the seizure of firearms and other supplies

PSA notes a diminished NPA capacity to conduct such attacks, with NPA rebels being limited to conducting low-level extortion such as food and supplies. Nonetheless, analysts continue to record isolated arson attacks by NPA rebels – with three incidents thus far targeting a construction company in Negros Oriental in February, a cassava milling facility in Bukidnon in April, and three pieces of heavy equipment in Negros Occidental in July. Other Violence Affecting Civilians:

• Targeted assassinations of former rebels, suspected informants, local government leaders, and tribal leaders
• Unintentional civilian casualties resulting from NPA ambushes against security forces and other targets

Most NPA-related violent incidents will still be armed encounters resulting from government operations targeting Communist insurgents. The NPA historically has an infrequent capability to conduct large-scale and coordinated attacks against multiple targets. The incidents that show the most capability in recent years include the May 2021 ambush of a PNP convoy in Occidental Mindoro, and the October 2022 ambush of an AFP convoy in Abra. Incidents such as these ones, where the NPA demonstrates a capability to ambush squad-sized formations or larger are increasingly rare. Most NPA ambushes are now against groups of one or two isolated government personnel. You can access the Communist Insurgency Monthly Reports here.

Islamist Insurgency

PSA's Monthly Overview (as of November 26, 2025): Analysts recorded two Islamist-related incidents in October 2025, which both occurred in Maguindanao del Sur. The first incident was an arrest turned encounter involving members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) who reportedly fired towards joint security forces in Datu Odin Sinsuat municipality. Two militants were killed while three government troops were wounded in the firefight. The second incident involved an ambush against a youth council chairperson of Barangay Poblacion 5 in Cotabato City, killing both the official and his brother on board the vehicle. PSA notes that this is the second ambush incident involving an elected official of Barangay Poblacion 5, the first being the ambush of a barangay chairwoman and her family along the Cotabato City main road in September. The official’s relatives believe that the attack was politically motivated and that “There are terrorist groups hiding in the city and are targeting them,” reinforcing the overlap among Islamist insurgency, violent crime, and political assassinations in the Bangsamoro region. PSA’s Forward-Looking Assessment (as of November 26, 2025): On October 1, the Supreme Court postponed the conduct of the Bangsamoro Parliamentary Elections (BPE) scheduled for October 13 to an indefinite date no later than March 30, 2026. The postponement comes as the Court ruled the Bangsamoro’s parliamentary districting laws as unconstitutional, nullifying the legal bases of the supposed October elections. PSA notes that the prevailing primary security concern for the Bangsamoro up to this point was the heightened risk of political violence in the context of the elections. The region entered its election season last August 14 and was supposed to end on October 28, roughly two weeks after the original scheduled elections. A gun ban was in effect and police checkpoints were established in the Bangsamoro region in line with election-specific security measures in the Philippines. However, effective last October 3, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) has lifted all election-related preparations, activities, and security measures, pending the revision of the BPE calendar of activities. This means that the gun ban and Comelec-mandated checkpoints will no longer be enforced in the region. Checkpoints that are not election-specific will likely remain in place. Analysts note that with the current status of decommissioning and other concerns over the peace process, the implications of another postponement of the elections are currently unclear. On one hand, it may allow the MILF and the national government to extend the transition period and work out concerns related to the peace process. On the other, it may not sit well with the general public or with traditional political clans, who have been dissatisfied with the MILF's governance to begin with. Analysts further note that a major role for the MILF’s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) in the next governing coalition, which is further strengthened by its alliance with the ruling political party, has the potential to make security gains more permanent in the region. However, how the various elements of the MILF will react if they lose in the elections remains a concern for the overall security situation in the Bangsamoro region and in Mindanao. In the short term, violence stemming from political assassinations and other election-related attacks from political families and entities outside the coalition remains an elevated concern from now until the polls are held and the positions are filled. PSA assesses that there will continue to be security issues in terms of rido or clan violence, armed criminal groups, political assassinations, and some low-level violence from terrorist-affiliated groups. Police statements indicate that aside from unidentified lawless elements, officials also attribute violent atrocities in the region to remnants of Islamist armed groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Dawlah Islamiyah. In terms of geography, most terrorism-related activity is limited to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and its immediate outskirts in Mindanao. The activities will be characterized by the following tactics and techniques: Targeting Civilians and Corporations: 

• Limited risk of kidnapping (concentrated in the Sulu Archipelago, the Zamboanga Peninsula, and the surroundings seas)
• Small-scale bombings and grenade attacks (within the BARMM and surrounding provinces)

Targeting Security Forces and the MILF: 

• Harassment with small arms fire
• Roadside improvised explosive device (IED) attacks
• Assassinations

Since the end of Marawi siege, the high end of Islamist insurgent and terrorist capability has consisted of the Basilan car bomb attack on July 31, 2018 and the coordinated suicide bombing attacks in Sulu on June 28, 2019 and August 24, 2020. You can access the Islamist Insurgency Monthly Reports here.