Philippines Communist Insurgency Monthly Report – December 2021
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PSA’s Forward-Looking Assessment: Over the short term, PSA anticipates that the high level of uncertainty will affect the intensity of communist insurgency activity. NPA incidents will continue to fluctuate in frequency month to month. However, NPA operational capacity does appear diminished in comparison to 2017 and 2018, largely as a result of government operations. The NPA’s capability in 2021 still appears to be largely comparable to the diminished capability they displayed in 2019.
PSA notes that there could likely be an increase in NPA-initiated attacks in Iloilo, Compostela Valley, and nearby areas following the death of two NPA leaders Joven Ceralvo alias “Lex” and Anna Sandra Reyes alias “Kaye.” Government troops are on standby on possible retaliatory attacks conducted by the Communist group. It is most likely that there will also be an uptick in violent incidents in the succeeding days/weeks leading to the NPA’s founding anniversary on March 29, as well as the campaign and election season in May.
Over the long term, the situation is also characterized by uncertainty depending on several factors – including the success of the government’s humanitarian relief and economic development policies. The CPP/NPA retains a level of popular support, particularly in rural areas, as well as the capacity to recruit and fund raise through so-called “legal fronts.” These two factors, support amongst the rural poor and the relatively extensive nature of the “legal fronts” help provide the NPA with resilience even as the security forces degrade their armed capabilities.
The communist insurgency is still characterized by the following tactics, techniques, and
characteristics:
Targeting Security Forces
- Assassinations
- Harassment (limited engagements with small arms fire)
- Small arms and IED ambushes (the NPA has displayed a continued capability in a limited number of instances to conduct complex small arms and IED ambushes. Our sense is that the security forces disrupt far more of these attempted attacks than the NPA successfully executes).
Targeting Corporations with Distributed Operations in Rural Areas:
- Extortion
- Arson
- Raids that involve the seizure of firearms and other supplies
Other Violence Affecting Civilians:
- Targeted assassinations of former rebels, suspected informants, local government
leaders, and tribal leaders - Unintentional civilian casualties resulting from NPA ambushes against the security forces
and other targets
The majority of violent incidents will still be armed encounters resulting from government operations targeting Communist insurgents. The NPA historically has an infrequent capability to conduct large-scale and coordinated attacks against multiple targets. Nationwide, no successful operations of that level of sophistication have occurred in 2019, 2020, or 2021. The high point of NPA capability from 2019 until now was the successful ambush of government forces on November 11, 2019 in Borongan City, Eastern Samar. However, this capability is less than what the NPA demonstrated in 2017 or 2018.
