Political Stability and Civil Unrest

The ongoing dispute between President Ferdinand Jr. Marcos and Vice President Sara Duterte reached a new boiling point following the Vice President’s assassination threat against the President on November 23. Since then, the Vice President is facing possible charges under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 and two impeachment complaints. Though the President has made it clear that he is not keen on impeaching the Vice President as of this time. PSA does not see this infighting significantly impacting the day-to-day operations and policy decision-making of the Philippine government in the short term. A successful destabilization plot against the current administration in the short term is also unlikely. The rift between the country’s top leaders does however enhance the possibility for:

• Reputational risk: The reputation for being a disunified and unpredictable government, potentially creating the impression of an uncertain business climate that is not conducive to investments
• Security risk: A possibility of limited violence between members/groups of opposing political supporters in rallies/demonstrations

PSA expects more political violence next year due to the upcoming mid-term elections in May. This expectation is not driven by the dispute between the country’s top national leaders. Rather, limited election-related violence, particularly at the local level (barangay and city/municipality), is a historical and endemic feature of the political process in the Philippines. PSA emphasizes that political and election-related violence tend to have little or limited direct safety and security impact on businesses or other private organizations. However, those who travel with politicians or government officials should consider heightened security measures. PSA also reminds clients that according to Philippine law, foreigners participating in political activities will be deported.

Summary of Events

In a virtual press conference on November 23, Vice President Sara Duterte publicly threatened the lives of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., First Lady Liza Araneta-Marcos, and House Speaker Martin Romualdez after accusing the President and the House Speaker of eliminating her.

“Don’t worry about my security because I’ve already spoken to someone. I told him, ‘If I get killed, kill BBM, Liza Araneta, and Martin Romualdez.’ No joke. No joke.” Vice President Sara Duterte

The Vice President made these remarks in the wake of her Chief of Staff Zuleika Lopez’s transfer to a correctional facility, which comes as part of the House legislative inquiry into alleged misuse of confidential funds under the Office of the Vice President (OVP) and during her tenure as Department of Education Secretary. Vice President Duterte sees this move as part of a conspiracy to weaken her position. In response to the threats, Malacañang responded swiftly with the Presidential Security Command (PSC) ramping up protective measures for the President and the First Family. The PSC said it intensified its coordination with law enforcement agencies to ensure the Marcos family’s safety. On November 26, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) issued a subpoena to the Vice President over possible violation of grave threats, and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020. The Vice President was directed to appear before the NBI on November 29 but failed to appear.

Destabilization of the Current Administration: Very Unlikely to Succeed

In recent months, the Duterte camp has made several attempts to mobilize its supporters from the civilian population and the military. But PSA does not foresee any of these attempts materializing in a successful destabilization of the current administration. On November 26, former President Rodrigo Duterte called on the military to “correct” what he described as “fractured governance” under the current Marcos Administration. This remark was described by some political observers as “seditious,” arguing it was aimed at inciting unrest within the Philippine military. The immediate response from the Philippine military is a positive indicator for political stability. The military came out to say that they will abide by the Philippine Constitution, a move analyst view as a strong commitment to upholding the rule of law, regardless of political tensions.

“The Armed Forces of the Philippines is a professional organization focused on its mandate to protect the people and the state. Our personnel are loyal to the Constitution and the Chain of Command… We are not loyal to a person, but to the position, and in that vow that we took — our oath — we say that we will continue to uphold the Constitution. So, that’s what we should focus on so that we don’t get confused. Our mandate is very clear.” Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief-of-Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr.

Since the beginning of this administration, the military and police have consistently affirmed their non-partisan stance and loyalty to the duly elected government, as mandated by the Constitution. This is particularly significant as an indicator of political stability, given that historically, destabilization attempts were often supported or instigated by members of the military and police. While former President Duterte remains a popular figure, support for the current administration is high in the upper ranks of military and police leadership and active-duty personnel. PSA also notes that the former President’s popularity has also waned since his departure from office. Even amongst those who express grievances with the current administration, the number of personnel who would actually be willing to risk their lives or careers on behalf of the former President is very low. The Duterte camp has had limited success with the mobilization of their supporters in demonstrations. There have been two rallies organized to support for the Vice President: a one-day protest in Davao City on November 23 and a week-long demonstration starting November 26 in EDSA Shrine, Quezon City. The turnout of these rallies has been small. The November 23 protest held in the bailiwick of the Duterte family had a maximum of 1,000 attendees. The week-long protest on November 26, garnered a maximum of 600 individuals, but supporters were not able to maintain this number throughout the entire week. PSA expects these localized demonstrations to continue, causing at most minimal disruptions such as traffic congestion or nuisance noise within the area. But they are unlikely to transform into a mass populist uprising like the 1986 EDSA Revolution, which at the very least had a million participants.

Areas of Concern

While the dispute between the President and Vice President is not expected to cause major disruptions to the day-to-day operations of the national government, it does enhance the possibility of some reputational and security risks.

Reputational Risk

As the infighting continues, there is a reputational risk for the Philippine government to be perceived as even more disunified and unpredictable. Due to the personality-driven nature of Philippine politics, government leaders are largely elected for their personalities rather than political platform or party affiliations, and so policy direction is mostly driven by these leaders’ own legislative preferences and self-interest. A lack of policy continuity between administrations is an often-cited criticism for the Philippine government and a source of uncertainty for investors. The spat between the President and Vice President could potentially propagate this negative image. These perceptions, some economic experts argue, could further undermine investor confidence in the Philippines.

Security Risk

The on-going tension between the country’s top national leaders increases the possibility of some small-scale, limited outbreak of violence. While the recent pro-Duterte demonstrations been peaceful, and at most caused minor disturbances such as traffic disruptions and nuisance noise within the area, the general historical trends of rallies in the Philippines point to rare instances of minor clashes between protesting crowd and local authorities. Protesters in heightened state of emotions can potentially hit back against authorities or get water cannoned by police if the situation deteriorates.

Status of Political Violence: The Norm for Election Season

As the May 2025 elections approach, PSA expects some heightened level of political violence at the barangay and municipal/city level. This expectation is not driven by the on-going spat between the country’s top leaders. Rather, Philippine elections feature some level of heightened political violence at the local level. The Philippines has historically grappled with elevated levels of political and election-related violence, most especially in the country’s rural areas. There tends to be an increase of political violent incidents as an election nears, with violence peaking on election day. Some reports show that pre-election violence commonly targets incumbent officials or their opposition, while election day violence is more voter-targeted and/or driven by allegations of election fraud. Post-election day, violence tends to target poll watchers and officials canvassing the results. Political violence is relatively more common at the local level, particularly the barangay, than at the provincial or national level. PSA emphasizes that political and election-related violence tend to have little or limited direct safety and security impact on businesses or other private organizations. However, the risk of being involved in one increase for those traveling with politicians or government officials. In the past, individuals in the same convoy or vehicle of a local politician have been unintentional targets of political assassinations simply for being in proximity with the intended targets.

Recommendations

While a successful destabilization plot against the current administration is unlikely in the short-term, companies and organizations are still advised to maintain a heightened level of situational awareness as the elections draw near. In general, PSA does not recommend traveling with an incumbent official or local candidate. Nonetheless, analyst recognizes the occasional need to travel with individuals or groups that are directly involved in the elections or public office. In this scenario, PSA recommends the following:

• Do not allow political rallies or other political activities on company facilities or sponsored by the company.
• Avoid aligning with a particular party or candidate, especially for employees holding sensitive or public-facing positions.
• Do not become involved with funding candidates.
• Do not allow individual candidates a platform on the company premises.

PSA also reminds its clients that under Philippine law, foreigners have limited political rights in the country. In 2021, the Bureau of Immigration deported a Dutch activist for joining political activities while in the Philippines.

Crime

Petty Crimes in Central Business Districts

Theft and robbery remain to be some of the most prevalent crimes in Metro Manila, partly due to the high concentration and retail establishments in the region. Based on open-source information that the team has gathered, there is some observable decline from the number of theft and robbery incidents in holiday season (September to December) to February 2025. PSA notes that theft and robbery tend to spike around the holiday season due to the increase in food traffic and perceived increase in affluence of the general public. Nonetheless, theft and robbery are crimes of opportunity, making them difficult to anticipate and even fully prevent. Increased social media visibility also tends to highlight these crime incidents, creating the perception of a worsening crime situation in the region. It is therefore often up to an individual to practice personal security measures to mitigate the risk of these incidents. PSA analysts generally agree that more notable risk factors for potential victims could be their physical state at the time (i.e. excessive displays of wealth through clothing or accessories, public drunkenness), their behavior and activity, and their location and company (i.e. standing along an empty side street alone). PSA’s general advice is to:

• Keep an eye on one’s belongings, especially when in crowded places. As much as possible, always keep any bag on your person.
• Avoid handling valuables like your mobile phone or wallet on the street. If needed, use your mobile phone near a well-lit establishment where there is visible security.
• Always maintain situational awareness in public.
• Try to “blend in” with your surroundings when considering how to present yourself in public. Be mindful of clothing and accessory choices, especially when going to “risky” areas such as entertainment districts or densely populated tourist sites.
• Do not carry large amounts of cash, passport, and other valuables unless necessary.

Persistence of Kidnapping in 2025

PSA notes that kidnapping incidents, especially POGO-related abductions, persist in 2025. This trend may continue to a lower extent as remnants of the POGO sector and associated Chinese threat actors remain in the country. At this time, PSA continues to believe that kidnapping in the Philippines is a specific, rather than generalized, threat. Analysts also note the increased abduction risk for ethnic Chinese nationals and other Southeast Asians, most especially those involved in the gambling or offshore gaming industry and transnational “scam hub” operations, relative to foreigners of other nationalities with no such links. Nonetheless, PSA acknowledges the recent travel bulletin put forth by the United States Embassy advising against travel to Western Mindanao due to the risk of kidnapping. Analysts believe this may have to do with the October 2024 abduction of Elliot Eastman in Zamboanga del Norte. To note, PSA has not yet recorded any new kidnapping incidents in Mindanao for 2025. To mitigate the risk of kidnapping, PSA recommends the following:

• Be aware of and understand the level of kidnapping risk you and your family/dependents may have, whether as a function of your location, occupation, or personal profile.
• Conduct formal risk and threat assessments of workplaces, schools, and places of residence when possible.
• Domestic staff should have backgrounds screened prior to employment and briefed on the need to maintain confidentiality of family movements, routines, and finances.
• Vary your travel routes to and from your home, workplace/school, and other frequently visited location.
• Use different vehicles on oft-taken routes if and when possible.
• Drivers should attend security and awareness driving courses.
• Vehicles should be tinted to limit visibility of the occupants. The front windshield should remain un-tinted for road safety.
• Attach or use tracking devices and applications on all personal devices and vehicles if and when possible.
• Refrain from posting information such as whereabouts and activities on social media in real time.
• Install SOS applications such as Everbridge or Parachute (iOS exclusive) to discreetly transmit important information regarding their location and movements to a trusted person.
• Brief staff and family members not to disclose travel itineraries, hotel plans, security arrangements, or schedules to outsiders.
• Provide training to family and staff on surveillance, detection, and reporting.

Potential Effect of the POGO Ban on Crime

The outlawing of POGO firms in the Philippines last December 2024 is expected by some to result in decreased levels of associated violent crimes in the long term. These include the incidence of trafficking, kidnapping, and other illicit activities where POGOs are often found, mainly perpetrated by Chinese criminal threat actors against fellow ethnic Chinese victims. However, PSA's sources in law enforcement and civic society believe that a short-term increase in criminal activity is possible as a result of the POGO ban:

• There have been reports of POGO owners resorting to violent crime as they divvy up remaining assets from closed-down properties amongst themselves.
• Rank-and-file POGO employees evading deportation may go underground and seek livelihood in the shadow economy.
• Chinese criminal threat actors linked to the POGO sector may try and position themselves within other industries.

There is a general consensus that any short-term spikes will still be largely confined to those involved or identified with the POGO and Internet gaming sector. There is currently no evidence pointing to these crimes spilling over to locals or foreign businesspeople. Nonetheless, PSA analysts note that some level of caution is still warranted.

Updates on Cybercrime

Cybercrime incidents against individuals and organizations have been steadily increasing, with a noticeable surge during the holiday season. These types of attacks typically include Text hijacking or spoofing, Phishing (SMS-phishing, voice-phishing, whaling), malicious use of deep-fakes, and business email compromise (BEC). Threat actors employing such attacks rely on psychological manipulation to trick victims into voluntarily divulging or providing confidential information and access to unauthorized individuals. Staff should be regularly reminded to check the validity of the source and pay close attention to any signs of a possible scam before interacting with any requests. Additionally, staff should also be regularly reminded to secure their personal accounts (social media, banking apps, others) amid the risk of cyber scams. PSA notes that text hijacking or ‘spoofing’ scams are on the rise, with cybercriminals increasingly exploiting SMS technology using SMS blasters to send fake messages in bulk and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers to intercept and manipulate text messages. These tools allow threat actors to make scam messages appear legitimate by ‘hijacking’ an existing message thread and impersonating a legitimate organization - tricking victims into sharing personal and sensitive information or clicking on malicious links. Read more about SMS Blasters here. In previous advisories, PSA highlighted several factors that contribute to the rise in cybercrime cases, including those observed during the holiday season. However, cybercriminals do not wait for a specific time of the year to strike. Instead, they operate year-round, taking advantage of various factors, including:

• Surge in digital and in-person transactions
• Increased online activity
• Heightened emotional state
• Haste and distraction

Authorities encourage cybercrime victims to report the incident to either the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), PNP Anti-Cybercrime Group, or the NBI Cybercrime Division. Victims are advised to collect evidence regarding the incident and other relevant information, including the scammer’s contact details, messages, and any financial transactions. If the scam is related to investments or consumer protection, victims may also file a complaint with consumer protection agencies such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).Additionally, the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) is promoting the use of the eGov Super App as a centralized platform for reporting online scams and other emergencies, streamlining communication between consumers and relevant government agencies. Scams involving banks and financial institutions, particularly e-wallets, remain a concern for individuals. The public is advised to be more vigilant of these scams. Here are some recommendations to help prevent being targeted for cyber-related incidents:

• Do not overshare information online – particularly on social media platforms. Sharing personal details online can make it easier for criminals to gather important information, which can be used against you or other people to conduct malicious activities.
• Be aware of text hijacking scams or “spoofing”. These types of scams involve threat actors sending fraudulent messages disguised as trusted companies, deceiving unsuspecting users to click on the link and provide personal and sensitive information.
• Do not store large amounts of money in e-wallets (i.e. GCash, Maya, GoTyme). There is an observed risk in using e-wallets for storing large amounts of money because they are not regulated by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). They are also perceived to be less secure than bank accounts and are often used only for quick simple transactions.
• Do not immediately click on any links or download any attachments allegedly from your bank or colleague without fully verifying the validity of the source. Pay close attention to the email header or sender and check for any spelling or grammar mistakes.
• Be aware of fake websites that may appear real. These often use the same logo, colors, and layout to appear genuine. Oftentimes, these websites have spelling mistakes as well as a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) like a legitimate website, but with a slight variation. Victims often fall for phishing links and fake sites that were designed to look like an official website.
• If you receive a suspicious email from your bank regarding an allegedly compromised account, do not respond or click on any links/attachments. Instead, go directly to your bank’s website through a search engine or through the bank’s app.
• Never share your One-Time Pin (OTP) with anyone. If you start receiving OTP SMS messages from your bank that you did not request, contact your bank, and notify them your account may have been compromised. Your bank will never ask for your OTP.
• Understand how potentially serious it is to have your phone, laptop, or any device hacked or stolen if you use them to access financial accounts or sensitive information. Make sure you can remotely access your phone or at least reset your financial account passwords if your device is compromised.
• If you suspect your bank account has been compromised or involved in a data breach, monitor your bank accounts for any unauthorized transactions. A data breach allows threat actors to gain unauthorized access to personal and sensitive information, which they can then exploit for malicious purposes.
• If you receive a call from a bank or any person claiming to be from an organization, take note that threat actors may have information on you such as your name, phone number or address. They will use this information to sound “legitimate”.
• If you receive a call from your bank regarding an allegedly compromised account, consider hanging up and calling the bank directly to verify that it is a legitimate security alert.
• Make purchases online from reputable sellers and secure your payment methods. Some online scam incidents involve customers being overcharged through multiple payment methods. Proceed with caution when using Facebook Marketplace or other social media platforms to make any sort of transaction.
• Use a well-respected password manager to store strong and unique passwords.Good password managers make it easy to create and store unique passwords in a secure fashion.

Foreign Conflict

PSA assesses that foreign conflict risk in the Philippines is currently low, but geopolitical tensions over the next decade in the region are likely to continue to increase. Analysts continue to believe that the situation between China and Taiwan is the most concerning with regards to the potential for armed conflict. Any outbreak of a major regional war, including a China-Taiwan conflict, would have a massive impact on the Philippine economy, even if the Philippines was a neutral party.   While tensions continue to escalate in the West Philippine Sea, and there is increased potential for some kind of crisis or armed skirmish, PSA does not see any desire on the part of China, the Philippines, nor the United States to actually fight a war over the West Philippine Sea. The parties involved are likely to seek to deescalate, even after a violent miscalculation or a clash.    The situation on the Korean peninsula is of increasing concern for geopolitical analysts. A major regional war is still unlikely, and any scenario short of a major regional conflict starting on the Korean peninsula will have few impacts for companies in the Philippines.  On the Risk of Conflict in The West Philippine Sea   The Philippines and China continue to face elevated tensions in the West Philippine Sea. Minor ramming incidents of Philippine vessels and injuries associated with water cannons have become relatively routine during encounters between the Philippine Coast Guard and Chinese vessels. The Chinese government has continually shown that it is willing to take actions that could cause the death of Filipino coast guard personnel or civilians in the West Philippine Sea.   Additionally, the Philippine government is determined to maintain and even potentially expand its outposts in the West Philippine Sea.  This is currently most evident at Ayungin Shoal. Construction and repair activities at Ayungin are particularly sensitive for the Chinese government, which appears to have convinced itself that at some point the Philippine government expressed a willingness to remove the outpost.   However, even if one of the worst-case scenarios occurred, that does not mean that the Philippines and China would be at war. If a Filipino is killed by a Chinese government action in the West Philippine Sea, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has indicated that he would activate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. While the activation of the Mutual Defense Treaty would bring the United States military into the equation, it does not necessarily mean war. PSA does not see any evidence that the Chinese, Philippine, nor US government are interested in fighting a war over the West Philippine Sea. Even upon the activation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, there will still be room for the parties to deescalate. The Philippine and US governments are likely to work to craft a policy response that is perceived as proportionate but would limit the risk of war.   Nonetheless, if the situation in the West Philippine Sea were to escalate further, there is a strong potential that the Philippine and Chinese governments may retaliate against each other economically.   Strategically, the situation in the West Philippine Sea is perhaps similar to the situation on the Indian and Chinese border in the Himalayas. In 2020, clashes on the Himalayan border resulted in the deaths of tens of Indian and Chinese soldiers. The dispute has continued to be a contest of will and logistics, positioning of forces, and construction of strategic infrastructure, but has not led to a war between the two countries.  

On China-Taiwan Tensions   PSA maintains that likelihood of a conflict between China and Taiwan in the short-term is low but that the likelihood of conflict is trending upwards. Over the next decade, there is a strong likelihood that geopolitical tensions between China and Taiwan will continue to escalate.  A conflict between China and Taiwan is not likely until China believes it is capable of succeeding in an invasion of the island of Taiwan. Some estimates from the US and Taiwanese defense departments assess that China may have the capability to conduct an invasion sometime between 2025 and 2027. There is an increasing depth of literature from US based analysts arguing the Chinese government is entering a “strategic window,” sometime between 2027 and the early 2030s, whereby military capabilities may make an invasion of Taiwan feasible, before that window closes amid stagnating economic growth in China. The American intelligence community has made its belief public that Chinese leadership has directed its military to have the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, but that a decision to invade has not yet been made.    Alternatively, analysts widely believe that the People’s Republic of China might risk a war if certain red lines are crossed, even it does not yet clearly have the capability to invade Taiwan. China is likely to go to war if Taiwan explicitly declares independence for example, even if China does not yet have a clear capability to invade. In such a scenario, China may resort to a blockade of Taiwan, or move to seize outlying Taiwanese islands such as Kinmen or Matsu. A blockade of Taiwan, particularly if it was enforced violently with Chinese ground-based missiles and the Chinese air force, is more within Chinese military capabilities even today. Even now, China likely maintains a capability to close Taiwanese ports to ship traffic if it is willing to use anti-ship missile to target traffic into those ports, or to target the ports themselves with ballistic missiles and other weapons. However, such actions would likely provoke a regional war with the United States. The Taiwanese government, moreover, is very likely to continue to avoid crossing said red lines.   Additionally, PSA assesses that there will likely be a variety of short-term indicators of a potential conflict as tensions rise between China and Taiwan rise, and for the most part, these indicators are still not present. These indicators could include a major military build-up on the Chinese coast that would be visible to civilian observers, an increased demonstration of China’s ability to conduct large-scale amphibious invasions, and a significant increase in Chinese stockpiling of fuel in its strategic oil reserve. These indicators, which PSA will use to help monitor the risk of conflict in the region for our clients, are detailed in-depth in our foreign conflict risk report, which is available to our clients here. Unfortunately, the visible indicators for a potential invasion are more numerous compared to a blockade of Taiwan, which would be easier for China to implement on short notice.    PSA still does not believe that a conflict is imminent or unavoidable, and we still don’t see significant short-term signs of conflict. However, we continue to assess that tensions are likely to be elevated over the next decade, and that tensions are likely to grow as China’s military power and capabilities increase relative to Taiwan and the USA. The risk of war between China and Taiwan is likely to grow over the next decade.    Any conflict between China and Taiwan would be deeply damaging to the Philippine economy, even if the Philippines was a neutral party. Any conflict would disrupt global trade and supply chains, but even more so for organizations based in the Philippines, due to the geographic position of the Philippines neighboring Taiwan. A conflict between China and Taiwan would partially be fought in Philippine territorial waters and likely in Philippine airspace, the northernmost point of the Philippines is only some 100 kilometers from Taiwan, and Metro Manila is only 800 kilometers from Taiwan. The Philippine economy is highly dependent on food and fuel imports, particularly petroleum products (the Philippines imports almost 100 percent of its petroleum products). It is difficult to imagine that the normal importation of fuel, food, and raw materials would happen in the Philippines while a major armed conflict was taking place in the region. The Philippine internet may also be vulnerable to disruptions due to its reliance on undersea cables.  There is also a concern that the Philippines will host an influx of refugees from Taiwan amidst a conflict. Planning for how the Philippine economy would function under wartime conditions is not robust, however there is increasing recognition in the foreign policy and national security communities about the importance of planning for a Taiwan contingency in all its aspects, including economic.   Furthermore, if tensions result in a war between China and the United States, there are strong possibilities that the Philippines will be pulled into a conflict directly. China for example could preemptively strike Philippine bases where the United States maintains military forces on a rotational basis. If the Philippines becomes a direct party to a conflict, the government will call up the reserves of the armed forces and potentially redirect the economy to a war footing, redirecting economic capacity to military purposes. Critical infrastructure, some of which serves dual military and civilian purposes, such as ports and airports, could be targeted. If the Chinese government decided to strike with long-range one-way attack drones, much of the Philippine power infrastructure and internet infrastructure is within range of these relatively inexpensive weapon systems. A war would partially be fought in Philippine waters and airspace, but we don’t see the Philippines being subject to widespread violence or indiscriminate targeting by a foreign military. Outside of some scenarios involving Batanes, we don’t see an invasion of any kind as plausible.   There are also likely to be opportunities for the private sector in light of increasing geopolitical tensions.  There may be opportunities to expand the Philippines defense industrial base, or otherwise leverage the growing relationship between the Philippines and its allies for business opportunities.   Potential for Conflict on the Korean Peninsula  Relations on the Korean Peninsula between North and South Korea are deteriorating and at somewhat of a low point. In 2023, South Korea announced the partial suspension of the inter-Korean comprehensive military agreement, leading to more military exercises closer to the border by both parties and intelligence collection across the border as well. In early 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stated that reunification between the North and the South was no longer viable, then proceeded to dismantle North Korean organizations meant to support reunification.  However, while there is an increased risk of armed clashes or some form of limited armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, these types of incidents will have limited relevance for the Philippines, unless they escalate to a major regional armed conflict involving the superpowers. Escalation to that level appears unlikely at this point in time.  

Communist Insurgency

PSA's Forward-Looking Assessment: Over the short term, PSA anticipates that communist insurgency activity will continue to fluctuate on a month-to-month basis, but it will continue to trend downwards. NPA operational capacity is clearly diminished in comparison to 2017 and 2018, and the vast majority of NPA activity is conducted by small groups of rebels attacking soft targets, such as isolated government soldiers, CAFGU checkpoints, and isolated pieces of heavy equipment in the case of businesses. Over the long term, the situation is characterized by uncertainty depending on several factors – including the success of the government’s humanitarian relief and economic development policies. The CPP-NPA retains a level of popular support particularly in rural areas, although the military claims that the group’s recruitment and fund-generation capabilities for its “legal fronts” have now been significantly diminished, hence the decision to tag all guerilla fronts in the country as “weakened guerilla fronts.” As of this time, the communist insurgency is characterized by the following tactics, techniques, and characteristics: Targeting Security Forces

• Assassinations
• Harassment (limited engagements with small arms)
• Ambushes with small arms and improvised explosive devices or IEDs (the NPA has displayed a continued capability in a limited number of instances to conduct complex small arms and IED ambushes. Our sense is that the security forces disrupt far more of these attempted attacks than the NPA successfully executes).

Targeting Corporations with Distributed Operations in Rural Areas:

• Extortion
• Arson attacks targeting isolated and poorly protected pieces of heavy equipment
• Raids that involve the seizure of firearms and other supplies

Other Violence Affecting Civilians:

• Targeted assassinations of former rebels, suspected informants, local government leaders, and tribal leaders
• Unintentional civilian casualties resulting from NPA ambushes against security forces and other targets

Most NPA-related violent incidents will still be armed encounters resulting from government operations targeting Communist insurgents. The NPA historically has an infrequent capability to conduct large-scale and coordinated attacks against multiple targets. The incidents that show the most capability in recent years include the May 2021 ambush of a PNP convoy in Occidental Mindoro, and the October 2022 ambush of an AFP convoy in Abra. Incidents such as these ones, where the NPA demonstrates a capability to ambush squad-sized formations or larger are increasingly rare. Most NPA ambushes are now against groups of one or two isolated government personnel.

Islamist Insurgency

PSA’s Forward-Looking Assessment: PSA is still optimistic that the security gains stemming from the Bangsamoro Peace Process may potentially be more permanent in nature. Key milestones in terms of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) demobilization and disarmament have been achieved, although the process has been imperfect. Foreign terrorist influence on armed groups is limited. Increased economic development and private sector investment are still needed to provide economic dividends from the political and security gains in Mindanao. Eyes are increasingly on the May 2025 elections, in which MILF-linked politicians will contest their seats in the Bangsamoro Parliament. How the various elements of the MILF would react if they lost the elections remains a concern. But most likely, after the 2025 elections there will be a new governing coalition in which the United Bangsamoro Justice Party at least plays a major role. PSA assesses that while security gains in the Bangsamoro Region – particularly against the threat of terrorism – may be more permanent, there will continue to be security issues in terms of rido or clan violence, armed criminal groups, political assassinations, and some low-level violence from terrorist-affiliated groups. Police statements indicate that aside from unidentified lawless elements, officials also attribute violent atrocities in the region to remnants of Islamist-related groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Authorities suspect that these groups remain resolved in conducting retaliatory attacks, particularly against isolated targets in the Lanao and Maguindanao provinces, amid successive military offensives targeting militants in these areas. In terms of geography, most terrorism-related activity is limited to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and its immediate outskirts in Mindanao. The activities will be characterized by the following tactics and techniques: Targeting Civilians and Corporations:

• Limited risk of kidnapping (concentrated in the Sulu Archipelago, the Zamboanga Peninsula, and the surroundings seas)
• Small-scale bombings and grenade attacks (within the BARMM and surrounding provinces)

 Targeting Security Forces and the MILF:

• Harassment with small arms fire
• Roadside improvised explosive device (IED) attacks
• Assassinations

Since the end of Marawi siege, the high end of Islamist insurgent and terrorist capability has consisted of the Basilan car bomb attack on July 31, 2018 and the coordinated suicide bombing attacks in Sulu on June 28, 2019 and August 24, 2020.